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ABSTRAcr 
Waterlogging and salinization arise in arid areas largely because two essential 
resources, irrigation water and the assimilative capacity of unconfmed 
aquifers. are not priced or allocated correctly to reflect scarcity values and 
opportunity costs. Farm-level decisions regarding irrigation methods and 
water volumes will not be socially optimal when such values are not 
communicated to farmers in the prices they pay for irrigation and drainage 
resources, or in allocations that define their water supply or drainage 
capacity. Modifying farm-level prices and allocations may be helpful in 
reducing the rate of increase in waterlogged and saline areas in many regions. 
This paper describes why farm-level irrigation and drainage strategies often 
differ from those that would be considered socially optimal. In the absence 
of appropriate economic incentives, farmers are not ~couraged to consider 
the off-farm and long-term impacts of their decisions regarding irrigation and 
drainage inputs. Policies that can be implemented to provide such 
encouragement include volumetric water pricing, water markets, tradable 
water allotments, adjustments in area-based cost recovery programs, and 
incentives for farmers to use irrigation methods that reduce deep percolation. 
WATERLOGGING AND SALINIZATION 
Waterlogging and salinization have reduced the productivity of agricultural 
land in arid regions since the rise and fall of Mesopotamia, even though the 
irrigation-induced causes of these conditions have been known for nearly as 
long (Jacobsen and Adams, 1958; Kovda, 1983; Szabolcs, 1987; Ghassemi et 
al., 1995). Known also as the "twin menace" of irrigated agriculture, 
waterlogging and salinization affect most of the world's large-scale irrigation 
systems and they continue to impose farm-level and public costs in the form 
of lost production and efforts to reduce the rate of increase in affected areas. 
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Waterlogged and saline soils are found naturally in many areas, but 
inappropriate irrigation also causes waterlogging and secondary salinization, 
resulting in economic losses when crop yields are reduced by high water tables 
and soil salinity (Barrow, 1987, 1991; Szabolcs, 1987; Rhoades, 1990; 
Smedema, 1990; Dregne, 1991; Abdel-Dayem, 1997). The primary irrigation-
induced causes include leakage from poorly lined irrigation canals and 
reservoirs, excessive water application, and inadequate drainage of agricultural 
land (Barrow, 1991; Scott, 1993). Seepage from irrigation facilities and deep 
percolation from farm fields enter unconfined aquifers that have become saline 
after many decades of irrigation. When a water table rises within 2 m of the 
soil surface, the root zone available to plants becomes restricted, salts rise to the 
surface by capillary action, and the resulting salinization can render land 
unsuitable for agriculture (Stone, 1984, p. 141; Amon, 1987 p. 147; Abernethy 
and Kijne, 1993; Abrol and Sehgal, 1994; Hillel, 1994). 
Some deep percolation is required in arid regions to remove salts from the root 
zone and sustain productivity, over time (Oster, 1984; Hoffman, 1990; Rhoades 
and Loveday, 1990). However, actual leaching fractions often exceed leaching 
requirements, because the non-water costs of irrigation rise with farm-level 
efforts to increase irrigation efficiency (Letey et al., 1990; Dinar and 
Zilberman, 1991). In addition, many water allocation and pricing policies do 
not motivate farmers to use water efficiently (Abrol et al., 1988; Prasad and 
Rao, 1991; Sampath, 1992; Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza, 1996; Rosegrant and 
Meinzen-Dick, 1996). Excessive deep percolation occurs in rolational water 
delivery systems in which farmers irrigate according to calendar-based schedules 
that do not match crop water requirements (Dhawan, 1989; Qureshi et al., 
1994). In many systems, water prices are too low to encourage farm-level 
improvements in water management or to justify investments in irrigation 
methods that minimize deep percolation (Mageed, 1994; Hillel, 1994, p. 217). 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECflVE 
From an economic perspective, irrigation-induced waterlogging and salinization 
in arid areas arise largely because irrigation water and the assimilative capacity 
of unconfined aquifers are not priced or allocated correctly to reflect scarcity 
values and opportunity costs. Volumetric water prices are lower than optimal or 
non-existent in many irrigated regions, and allocation procedures are often 
based on rolational schedules that do not provide the flexibility or cerlainty 
required for farmers to optimize water use. In most irrigation systems, farmers 
may -discharge- deep percolation to unconfined aquifers at no charge and with 
no restrictions, even though assimilative capacity is often limited. As a result, 
the scarcity values of irrigation water and unconfined aquifer capacity are not 
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communicated to farmers in resource prices or allocations, providing them with 
little incentive to consider the opportunity costs or the off-farm effects of 
irrigation and leaching activities. 
Some Useful Economic Concepts 
QpJxntunjty cost is the incremental value of a resource or input in its next best 
alternative use. For example, when a farmer's water supply is limited, the 
opportunity cost of water used to irrigate a tomato field is the value that could 
be generated if that water were used instead to irrigate a cotton field. 
Scarcity value is the implicit value of a limited resource that mayor may not be 
priced in a market setting. For example, the scarcity value of water on a farm 
with a limited water supply is the value that could be generated with an 
additional acre-foot of irrigation water. 
A socially optimal allocation of resources maximizes the net benefits generated 
in production, minus any costs that are not generally considered by fums or 
consumers, such as the environmental or off-farm effects of irrigation and 
drainage activities. The socially optimal combination of inputs and outputs will 
differ from the farm-level profit-maximizing combination when farm activities 
generate external costs. The social optimum will vary, over time, with changes 
in society's preferences regarding resource allocation. 
External costs and benefits are the off-farm effects of agriCUltural activities. 
These generally are not considered by farmers when choosing profit-maximizing 
input and output combinations. Economic incentives such as effluent fees and 
cost-sharing programs for improving irrigation technology are designed to 
encourage farmers to consider external costs and benefits. 
A djscount rate can be used to describe the preference of an individual or 
society for receiving net returns or net benefits in the near term, rather than 
receiving those returns or benefits in future years. Higber discount rates 
describe stronger time preference. For example, an individual with a discount 
rate of 6~ would prefer to receive net returns more quickly than an individual 
with a discount rate of 4", if all other characteristics of the individuals are the 
same. The discount rates of individual fums and consumers will be higher than 
social discount rates if society places greater emphasis on net benefits available 
to future generations. 
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Off-farm effects are considered external costs in economic models of faim 
production because they are not paid by farmers when selecting crops or 
choosing irrigation inputs (Young and Horner, 1986; Chisholm, 1987; UpstiU 
and Yapp, 1987; Ellis, 1992, p. 264; Izac, 1994; Strojan, 1995). Economic 
incentives and other policies that encourage farmers to internalize exteri1al. costs 
can be identified by examining the farm-level and public goals regarding 
irrigation, and noting the differences in optimizing criteria, that describe how 
farm-level and societal net benefits are maximized. Appropriate policies will 
provide farm-level incentives that are consistent with the criteria for maximizing 
societal net benefits. 
Fann-l.eyel Goals and Criteria 
The farm-level irrigation objective can be described as maximizing the present 
value of net revenue, over time, while maintaining the quality of productive 
resources. The standard optimizing criterion for farmers in a humid region 
where soil salinity is not a problem is to equate the incremental value of water 
in crop production with its incremental cost, or price (Upton, 1996, Ch. 9). 
Incremental values are determined by crop-water production functions and crop 
prices, while water cost may be an explicit price for surface water delivery or 
the unit cost of pumping groundwater (Howell, 1990; Dinar et al., 1991). As 
water price or cost increases, farmers will reduce the volume of water applied, 
often by increasing the use of labor or technology to maintain crop yields, while 
irrigating more efficiently. 
In arid regions, farmers must also consider the long-term impacts of irrigation 
and leaching on soil salinity. The net change in salinity is usually positive 
following irrigation events because plants use the water, while leaving salts in 
the soil. Leaching events displace salts from the proflle by flushing soils with 
relatively good quality water. The farm-level optimizing criterion for saline 
areas includes the long-term impact of adding salts and the long-term benefit of 
moving salts through the soil profile when applied water exceeds crop water 
requirements. 
Farmers in arid regions will achieve their profit maximizing goal if they equate 
the incremental value generated with irrigation or leaching water, plus the value 
gained by removing salts from the soil, with the price paid for water and the 
long-term, incremental damage caused by adding salts. Farmers will consider 
similar issues when seleCting irrigation methods and water management 
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practices. Surface irrigation methods (furrows, borders, and basin) are less 
expensive than sprinklers or drip systems, but they can also be less efficient and 
can generate more deep percolation during irrigation and leaching events. 
Farmers using more efficient methods can achieve irrigation goals with a 
smaller volume of water and they can achieve greater distribution uniformity 
that may enhance crop yields (Barrow, 1987, Ch. 7; Letey et al., 1990; Agnew 
and Anderson, 1992, Ch. 6). 
Public Goals and Criteria 
The public's goal regarding a publicly funded irrigation project may be 
described as maximizing the present value of societal net benefits generated, 
over time. Societal benefits include the value of farm products and other 
agricultural and non-agricultural benefits provided by an irrigation project, 
while costs include farm-level production costs, operation and maintenance of 
irrigation facilities and any off-farm impacts of irrigation and leaching. Societal 
costs also include the opportunity costs of water resources in regions where 
demand for water exceeds supply. 
The net social benefit of an irrigation project is maximized when the 
incremental social benefit is equal to the incremental social cost. In particular, 
the sum of incremental agricultural and non-agricultural benefits must be equal 
to the incremental cost of water delivery, plus the long-term cost of adding salt 
during irrigation and leaching, the opportunity cost of water, and the long-term 
cost of rising water tables. 
Farm-level decisions regarding water use will not be socially optimal unless 
water prices reflect incremental delivery costs, opportunity costs and the off-
farm impacts of irrigation and leaching activities. In addition, farm-level 
discount rates used to calculate the present value of the long-term costs and 
benefits of irrigation and drainage activities must be the same as social discount 
rates. In practice, farm-level rates will likely exceed those used by the public to 
evaluate returns from irrigation projects, as individuals often place greater 
relative values on near-term net revenues than public agencies, which may 
assign greater relative value to the welfare of future generations (Sen, 1984, 
p. 175). When this occurs, farm-level choices regarding irrigation water and 
other inputs may result in a faster rate of waterlogging and salinization than is 
socially optimal (Quiggin, 1987; Greiner, 1997). This effect, in combination 
with inappropriate water prices and allocation methods, may explain why many 
large-scale irrigation projects encounter problems of waterlogging and 
salinization sooner than expected by project planners (Abul-Ata, 1917; Kapoor 
and Kavdia, 1994; Ramanathan and Rathore, 1994). 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Differences in the criteria for maximizing the present value of farm-level or 
societal net benefits explain why farm-level choices of irrigation and leaching 
inputs are not socially optimal. Farmers have no economic incentive to 
consider the external effects of deep percolation on a regional water table and 
farm-level discount rates may exceed the social rate. In addition, farm-level 
water use will exceed the social optimum when the price of water is less than 
the incremental cost of delivery or when farmers are not presented with 
opportunity costs. Farm-level choices of water management inputs will also 
differ from societal optima when prices do not reflect off-farm effects. Policies 
that modify the farm-level price or availability of water and other inputs may be 
useful in closing the gap between farm-level and socially optimal input choices. 
We examine the potential role of water pricing and allocation policies, water 
markets, land assessments, and subsidies to encourage improvements in water 
management practices. 
Water prices 
Economic theory suggests that if the farm-level price of water includes the 
incremental delivery cost, the opportunity cost, and the long-term impact of 
rising water tables, farmers will choose the socially optimal levels of water use. 
In theory, the optimal water price should vary among farms according to 
differences in delivery costs and the impacts of irrigation and leaching on 
regional water tables. However, in most irrigated areas farm-specific water 
table effects cannot be estimated accurately, and farm-specific water prices are 
either very costly to implement or politically infeasible. A uniform water price, 
or a price that varies by region, is more likely to be implemented. In those 
situations, an estimate of average water table effects can be obtained using 
hydrologic data that describe irrigation water deliveries and rising water tables, 
over time, or technical coefficients that describe the proportion of applied water 
that becomes deep percolation when using various irrigation methods. The 
estimated average value could be used in place of farm-specific values when 
determining a uniform water price. 
The opportunity cost of water can be estimated by considering the increase in 
regional net revenue that could be generated with additional water supply. In 
regions with an active water market, this may be estimated using water market 
prices, as these would reflect a major component of the opportunity cost of 
water. The incremental cost of water delivery includes operation and 
maintenance costs for the water delivery system. The portion of those costs that 
should be included in water prices may vary with public goals and the 
distribution of benefits from irrigation projects (Sampath, 1992). 
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Implementing a uniform water price in place of fann-specific prices will negate 
some of the efficiency gains implied by optimal water prices, but this should not 
dissuade public officials from considering a uniform pricing policy. In many 
irrigated regions, any effort to implement or enhance volumetric water prices 
will likely motivate fann-Ievel improvements in water management that will 
improve the productivity of scarce water resources and reduce deep percolation. 
The societal value of this result may be substantial, even if water prices are not 
precisely the optimal prices prescribed by theory. 
Volumetric water prices may also provide an economic incentive for public 
water agencies to improve delivery service and to reduce seepage along main 
and secondary canals, particularly if agency budgets are made dependent upon 
the collection of revenue from water sales (Moore, 1989; Small and Carruthers, 
1991, pp. 52-53; Ellis. 1992, p. 271). Water agency personnel in regions 
where water is delivered at no charge to fanners and water rights are not 
assigned have little incentive to spend limited funds on canal improvement 
projects (Repetto, 1986). Placing a value on water at the agency level may 
reduce waterlogging and salinization caused by seepage from main and 
secondary canals. 
Water marJcets and water rights 
Formal and informal water markets are effective in communicating scarcity 
values among potential buyers and sellers, by providing fanners with an 
opportunity to lease or sell a portion of their water supply for a specific time 
interval or in perpetuity (Dudley, 1992; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; 
Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick, 1996; Dinar et al., 1997). Markets also 
encourage fanners to consider opportunity costs 'explicitly when they choose 
cropping patterns and irrigation methods (Dinar and Letey, 1991; Weinberg et 
al., 1993). Fanners with attractive market opportunities may choose to improve 
water management practices to make water available for sale or lease. Fann-
level efforts to ·convert· surface runoff or deep percolation into marketable 
water volume will reduce pressure on regional water tables. In areas where 
surface runoff or deep percolation is used by downstream fanners, it may be 
necessary to compensate those fanners for reductions in their water supply. 
Water markets eliminate the need for public agencies to determine the 
opportunity cost or scarcity value of water, as market participants will express 
their desire to purchase or sell water at prices that reflect prevailing perceptions 
of scarcity. However, markets do require that property rights to water, or water 
use rights, are defined and enforced (Hearne and Easter 1995; Anderson and 
Snyder, 1997, pp. 22-25; Perry et al. 1997). In many regions, this will require 
improvements in water measurement and control capability, but those 
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improvements would also support volumetric water pricing and may enable 
water agencies to provide farmers with greater flexibility in scheduling water 
deliveries. 
Describing international experience with water markets, Briscoe (1997) 
concludes that -from a conceptual, practical and political perspective, the 
appropriate approach for ensuring that the scarcity value of water is transmitted 
to users is to clarify property rights and to facilitate the leasing and trading of 
these rights. - Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick (1997) include a -net shift of 
authority for allocating water use rights from public agencies to the use right 
holders themselves through private transactions and arrangements- in their list 
of themes regarding future water management policies and institutions. 
Rosegrant (1997) suggests that the most important water policy reforms will 
involve changing the institutional and legal environment in which water is 
supplied to one that enables individuals to make their own decisions regarding 
water use, while at the same time presenting them with the true scarcity value of 
water. 
Many examples of water markets have been described in the literature, 
including those in California (Cummings and Nercessiantz, 1994; Howitt 1994), 
Chile (Gazmuri 1994; Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1996), India (Ianakarajan, 1993; 
Shah, 1993; Saleth, 1996; Shah and Ballabh, 1997), and Pakistan (Chaudhry, 
1990; Meinzen-Dick, 1994). In many cases, markets have improved the 
productivity of water resources while providing farmers with income-enhancing 
opportunities. 
Water allotments 
Some of the world's largest irrigation systems are operated by central 
government agencies that control the release and delivery of water along main 
and secondary canals, and determine how much water will be delivered to 
farmers or water user associations (Upton, 1996, pp. 200-201). There may be 
little or no formal experience with water markets or water rights in those 
systems, and the political desire to implement such programs may be limited. A 
potentially useful alternative is a program of water allotments that defme how 
much water or delivery capacity is available to individual farmers or water user 
associations, each year, as a function of water supply or an environmental goal, 
such as reducing deep percolation. Allotments would provide farmers with 
clear information regarding water availability, without assigning ownership, as 
is usually implied in a system of formal water rights. The economic efficiency 
of an allotment program can be enhanced by allowing farmers to trade their 
allotments, either individually or as members of water user associations. 
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A program of water allotments can be designed to achieve specific program 
goals, while minimizing distortion of farm-level crop choices. For example, if 
the goal is to reduce deep percolation in a region where the aggregate water 
supply is not limiting, crop-specific allotments defmed according to crop water 
and leaching requirements would provide farmers with sufficient water to 
irrigate crops they choose, provided they apply only the required water. 
Alternatively, if the aggregate water supply is limiting, and waterlogging 
problems are due to uneven distribution of water among farmers, a program of 
uniform water allotments defined according to the available supply may be more 
effective in reducing deep percolation, while improving aggregate production. 
Such a program would encourage farmers to consider the scarcity value and 
opportunity costs of water when choosing crops and irrigation methods. 
Examples of crop-specific and uniform water allotments are compared in 
Table 1. A farmer with 3 ha of land planted in equal portions of alfalfa, cotton, 
and sugarbeets would be allotted 31,350 m3 of irrigation water in a crop-
specific program, while a farmer with the same land area would be allotted 
27,000 m3 in a uniform program. The second farmer may be able to produce 
the same crops by improving water management practices and, possibly, by 
allowing a shallow aquifer to provide a portion of crop water requirements. 
This would further enhance efforts to reduce the rate of increase in waterlogged 
areas. In this example, the uniform program may cause farmers to discontinue 
growing sugarcane, but that result may enhance societal net benefits in a region 
with a limited water supply or delivery capacity, uneven distribution of water 
among farmers, or problems with waterlogging and salinization. 
Some of the farmers receiving 9,000 m3 per ha in the uniform program may 
choose to sell or lease a portion of their allotment to other farmers for 
appropriate compensation. Farmers selling allotments may choose to grow 
crops with smaller water requirements and improve water management 
practices, while earning revenue from the sale or lease of allotments. Voluntary 
market transactions would determine the appropriate prices of allotments, and 
those prices would likely change, over time, with changes in crop prices and the 
cost of water, labor, and other inputs. 
Land Assessments 
Public water agencies in India, Pakistan, and other countries with major 
irrigation projects charge farmers for water delivery services using area-based 
assessments intended to recover the costs of operation and maintenance 
(Puttaswamaiah, 1994, p. 187; Kemal et al., 1995; Tsur and Dinar, 1997). The 
charges are usually higher for crops with higher crop water requirements and in 
regions with higher costs of service. These programs are less costly to 
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implement than volumetric water pricing (Small and Carruthen, 1991, p. 141), 
but do not provide an economic incentive to use water efficiently because the 
farm-level cost of additional water within a season is zero. 
An economic incentive to reduce deep percolation can be incorporated in area-
based assessment programs by enhancing the crop-specific price structure to 
reflect the deep percolation objective. In particular, an area-based 
Table 1. Examples of crop-specific and uniform water allotments to 
encourage reductions in deep percolation 
Estimated Estimated Crop-Specific Uniform 
Crop Water Leaching Water Water 
Crop Requirement Requirement Allotment Allotment 
(m3 per hectare) 
Alfalfa 12,000 1,200 13,200 9,000 
Cotton 10,000 1,000 11,000 9,000 
Sugarbeets 6,500 650 7,150 9,000 
Sugarcane 20,000 2,000 22,000 9,000 
Wheat 5,500 550 6,050 9,000 
Notes: Crop water requirements are the midpoints of ranges 
in crop water requirements reported by Doorenbos and Kassam 
(1979, pp. 6-7). 
Leaching requirements are estimated as 10% of crop water 
requirements, as recommended for irrigation water with an 
electrical conductivity (EC) of 0.75 mmhos/cm and drain water 
with an EC of 8.0 mmhos/cm (Doorenbos and Pruitt, 1975, 
p. 127). 
Uniform water allotments describe an example in which the total 
water supply or delivery capacity in a canal command area is 
limited to an average delivery of 9,000 m3 per hectare. 
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surcharge can be imposed on fields that receive larger water deliveries than 
crop-specific targets determined by the water agency, in consultation with 
fanners and water user associations. The targets could be established at levels 
that enable fanners to satisfy crop water and leaching requirements without 
generating excessive deep percolation, such as the crop-specific water allotment 
volumes shown in Table 1. Farmers exceeding those volumes could be required 
to pay an area-based surcharge determined by estimating the external cost of 
deep percolation, which is the present value of future reductions in regional net 
revenues due to rising water tables. The estimated opportunity cost of water 
also could be included in the surcharge to provide an additional incentive for 
farmers to achieve the targets. 
Water Mana&ement Inputs 
Improvements in water management practices can generate farm-level benefits 
by reducing the volume of water applied to soils and, thus, reducing the rate of 
salt accumulation. This provides an economic incentive to implement such 
practices, which include using sprinkler and drip systems, laser leveling, and 
hiring additional labor to improve the management of surface irrigations. 
Delivering water with greater precision enables farmers to reduce deep 
percolation, while maintaining or improving crop yields. However, farm-level 
expenditures for irrigation increase with the use of higher technology systems 
and a long-term cost may arise if the reduction in deep percolation reduces the 
rate at which salts are removed from soils. Farmers selecting irrigation methods 
will evaluate near-term and long-term effects, but will not consider the off-farm 
benefit of increasing regional water table depth. 
The societal benefits of improvements in irrigation methods may be sufficient to 
justify public policies that motivate farm-level adoption, such as subsidizing the 
hiring of additional labor or the purchase of selected irrigation systems. 
Providing small fanners with access to credit and offering low-interest loans 
may encourage them to purchase new irrigation systems or install private 
tubewe1ls to pump water from shallow aquifers. In regions with area-based 
water service charges, lower rates might be offered to farmers using irrigation 
methods that generate less deep percolation. 
Transaction Costs 
Some of the economic gains achieved by implementing volumetric water prices 
or establishing water markets will be offset by transaction costs that include 
efforts to measure water deliveries, collect revenue from water sales, record 
market transactions, and protect water rights. Transaction costs of market 
514 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
activity include the costs of identifying viable purchase and sale opportunities, 
negotiating terms of agreements, and mitigating or compensating for any third-
party impacts (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). The transaction costs of 
implementing water rights and pricing programs may be particularly high in 
developing countries where large irrigation systems deliver water to many small 
farms (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). Public agencies can reduce private 
transaction costs by collecting and sharing water market information, and 
providing an efficient and secure procedure for transferring water rights. 
The administrative costs of water pricing, allocation, and marketing programs 
can be substantial, particularly in countries where improvements in delivery 
channels, measuring devices, and operational procedures are required t 0 enable 
better control and measurement of water deliveries. Institutional enhancements 
may also be required to support volumetric water pricing and trading of water 
rights or allotments. However, administrative costs can be reduced by choosing 
the appropriate level at which to implement innovative programs and by 
adopting technologies that support program goals. For example, Small (1989) 
and Meinzen-Dick and Rosegrant (1997) describe volumetric -water 
wholesaling" in which a public agency sells water to a water user association at 
some point in the delivery system where volumetric measurement is feasible. 
The association is then responsible for recovering water costs frOm individual 
members. Measurement capability might be extended to lower levels of the 
delivery system by designing and installing new metering devices that provide 
volumetric measurement at a reasonable cost (Martinez et al., 1994). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Economic incentives and other policies that motivate farmers to improve water 
management may enhance resource use and sustainability in arid regions, and 
reduce the rate of increase in waterlogged and saline areas. Several 
engineering, administrative, and political issues will require attention in some 
countries to enable implementation of such policies, and transaction costs may 
not be trivial. Public investments may be required to improve irrigation 
systems to support better control and measurement of water deliveries before 
volumetric pricing, water allotments, or water marketing can be implemented 
successfully. The administrative costs of water delivery will likely increase 
when incentive programs are implemented and political support may be needed 
to gain approval for any changes in farm-level expectations regarding water 
supply when rights or allotments are defined and traded. 
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Public officials often describe the potential engineering and political costs of 
system improvements as binding constraints on policy enhancements, 
particularly in developing countries and in regions where water scarcity is not 
yet receiving national attention. However, in many arid countries, competition 
for land and water resources, and the value of output from irrigated agriculture, 
will continue to increase with rising populations and income levels. Therefore, 
it may be useful to begin improving water delivery systems and enhancing the 
policy environment in the near-term, while pressure on resources is not yet 
severe. This may enable public officials to implement economic incentives 
successfully in future, when water scarcity and the losses from waterlogging and 
salinization become ever more costly. 
Economic incentives may also provide a valuable complement to engineering 
efforts that address waterlogging and salinization. For example, the cost of 
regional subsurface drainage systems, public tubewell programs, or tree planting 
efforts could be funded partially with revenues collected from water sales or 
land assessments designed to reduce deep percolation. This would reduce public 
expenditures for drainage relief programs, while providing farm-level incentives 
that may reduce the size and extent of facilities needed to collect and manage 
subsurface drain water. An appropriate combination of economic incentives and 
engineering efforts may enable farmers and the public to sustain the benefits 
derived from agricultural production in arid regions, despite the perpetual threat 
from waterlogging and salinization. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The helpful comments of three reviewers have improved the paper and are 
certainly appreciated. This paper is Rhode Island Agricultural Experiment 
Station Publication Number 3754. 
REFERENCES 
Abdel-Dayem, S. 1997. Waterlogging and salinity, pp. 99-116 in A.K. Biswas, 
(ed.) Water Resources: Enyironmental Plannin~, Management. and 
DevelOJ)ment, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Abernethy, C.L. and Kijne, l.W. 1993. Managing the interactions of irrigation 
systems with their environments, pp. 75-103 in EcoIQgically Sound 
Resources Management in Irrigation, German Association for Water 
Resources and Land Improvement, Verlag Paul Parey, Hamburg, 
Germany. 
516 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
Abrol, I.P. and Sehgal, J.L. 1994. Degraded lands and their rehabilitation in 
India, pp. 129-144 in D.I. Greenland and I. Szabolcs (eels.) Soil Resilience 
and Sustainable Land Use, CAB International, Wallingford, UK. 
Abrol, I.P., Yadav, J.S.P. and Massoud, F.I. 1988. Salt-affected soils and 
their management. FAO Soils Bulletin 39, Food and Agriculture 
Organization, Rome. 
Abul-Ata, A.A. 1977. The conversion of basin irrigation to perennial systems 
in Egypt, pp. 99-105 in E.B. Worthington (ed.) Arid Land Irrl,ation in 
DeyeJgpin, Countries: Enyironmental Problems and Effects. Pergamon 
Press, Oxford. 
Agnew, C. and Anderson, E. 1992. Water Resources in the Arid Realm, 
Routledge, London. 
Anderson, T.L. and Snyder, P. 1997. Water Markets: Primin, the InYisible 
fl.uIlll,. Cato Institute, Washington, DC. 
Amon, I. 1987. Modernization of Agriculture in Develgping Countries: 
ResoUrces. Potentials and Problems, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 
New York. 
Barrow, C.l. 1987. Water Resources and Agricultural DeveJQPment in the 
~, Longman Scientific & Technical, Harlow, England. 
Barrow, C.l. 1991. Land Degradation: DevelQPment and Breakdown of 
Terrestrial Enyironments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Briscoe, J. 1997. Managing water as an economic good, pp. 339-361 in M. 
Kay, T. Franks and L. Smith (eds.) Water: Economics. Man~ement and 
Demand, E & FN Span., London. 
Chaudhry, M.l. 1990. The adoption of tubewell technology in Pakistan. ~ 
Pakistan Deyelgpment Review 29(3,4), 291-303. 
Chisholm, A. 1987. Abatement of land degradation: regulations vs. economic 
incerttives, pp. 223-247 in A. Chisholm and R. Dumsday (eds) LiuHl 
Degradation: Problems and Policies, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Economic Approach to Improving Water Management 517 
Cummings, R.G. and Nercessiantz V. 1994. The use of water pricing to 
enhance water use efficiency in irrigation: case studies from Mexico and 
the United States, pp. 79-95 in G. I.e Moigne, K.W. Easter, W.J. Ochs 
and S. Giltner (eds.) Water Policy and Water Markets. Technical Paper 
249, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Dhawan, B.D. 1989. Water resource management in India: issues and 
dimensions. Indjan Journal of AKricultural Economics 44(3), 233-241. 
Dinar, A. and I.etey, 1. 1991. Agricultural water marketing, allocative 
efficiency, and drainage reduction. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and ManaKement 20,210-223. 
Dinar, A. and Zilberman, D. 1991. The economics of resource-conservation, 
pollution-reduction technology selection: the case of irrigation water. 
Resources and Energy 13, 323-348. 
Dinar, A., Rhoades, J.D., Nash, P., and Waggoner, B.L. 1991. Production 
functions relating crop yield, water quality and quantity, soil salinity and 
drainage volume. Agricultural Water Management 19, 51-66. 
Dinar, A., Rosegrant M.W. and Meinzen-Dick R. 1997. Water allocation 
mechanisms: principles and examples. Policy Research Working Paper 
1779, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Doorenbos, 1. and Pruitt, W.O. 1975. Guidelines for predicting crop water 
requirements. Irrigation and Drainage Paper 24, FAO, Rome. 
Doorenbos,l. and Kassam, A.H. 1979. Yield response to water. Irrigation 
and Drainage Paper 33, FAO, Rome. 
Dregne, H.E. 1991. Arid land degradation: a result of mismanagement. 
Geotimes 36(6), 19-21. 
Dudley, N.J. 1992. Water allocation by markets, common property and 
capacity sharing: companions or competitors'!. Natural Resources Journal 
32(4), 757-778. 
Ellis, F. 1992. AKricultural Policies in DeyelOJling Countries, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
518 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
Gazmuri, S.R. 1994. Chile's market-oriented water policy: institutional aspects 
and achievements, pp. 65-78 in G. Le Moigne, K.W. Easter, W.I. Ochs 
and S. Giltner (eds.) Water Policy and Water Markets, Technical Paper 
249, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Gazmuri, S.R. and Rosegrant, M.W. 1996. Chilean water policy: the role of 
water rights, institutions and markets. Water Resources DevelWment 
12(1), 33-48. 
Ghassemi, P., lakeman, A.I. and Nix, H.A. 1995. Salinisation of Land and 
Water ResOurces, Center for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Canberra, Australia. 
Greiner, R. 1997. Optimal farm management responses to emerging soil 
salinisation in a dryland catchment in eastern Australia. Land Deeradation 
& DeyelQpment 8, 281-303. 
Hearne R.R. and Easter W.K. 1995. Water allocation and water markets: an 
analysis of gains-from-trade in Chile. World Bank Technical Paper 315. 
Washington, DC. 
Hillel, D. 1994. Riyers of Eden: The Strugele for Water and the Ouest for 
Peace in the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hoffman, G.I. 1990. Leaching fraction and root zone salinity control, pp. 237-
261 in K.K. Tanji (ed.) Agricultural Salinity Assessment and Management, 
American Society of Civil Engineers, New York. 
Howell, T. 1990. Relationships between crop production and transpiration, 
evapotranspiration, and irrigation, pp. 391-434 in B.A. Stewart and D.R. 
Nielsen (eds.) Irrigation Qf Agricultural CT0J2S, American Society of 
Agronomy, Madison, Wisconsin. 
Howitt, R.E. 1994. Empirical analysis of water market institutions: the 1991 
California water market. Resource and Energy Economics 16, 357-371. 
Izac, A-M.N. 1994. Ecological-economic assessment of soil management 
practices for sustainable land use in tropical countries, pp. 77-96 in D.I. 
Greenland and I. Szabolcs (eds.) Soil Resilience and Sustainable Land Usc, 
CAB International, Wallingford, UK. 
Economic Approach to Improving Water Management 519 
1acobsen, T. and Adams, R.M. 1958. Salt and silt in ancient Mesopotamian 
agriculture. ~ 128, 1251-1258. 
1anakarajan, S. 1993. Economic and social implications of groundwater 
irrigation: some evidence from south India. Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 48(1), 65-75. 
Kapoor, A.S. and Kavdia, P.S. 1994. Drainage and salinity problems in Indira 
Gandhi Canal Project Area, pp. 104-116 in R. Hooja and P.S. Kavdia 
(eds.) Planning for SustainabiIity in Irrigation, Rawat Publications, New 
Delhi. 
Kemal, A.R., Bilquees, F. and Mahmood, Z. 1995. Case study on the 
economic valuation of the salinization and waterlogging as a result of 
inappropriate irrigation in Pakistan. Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics, Ishunabad. 
Kovda, V.A. 1983. Loss of productive land due to salinization. A.ml2ig 12(2), 
91-93. 
Letey, J., Dinar, A., Woodring, C. and Oster, I.D. 1990. An economic 
analysis of irrigation systems. Irrigation Science 11, 37-43. 
Mageed, Y.A. 1994. The central region: problems and perspectives, pp. 101-
119 in P. Rogers and P. Lydon (eds.) Water in the Arab World: 
Perspectives and Prognoses, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Martinez, P., Mundo, M. and Carrillo, M. 1994. Measurement devices for 
irrigation water. Water Resources DevelOJ)ment 10(3), 339-350. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. 1994. Private tubewell development and groundwater 
markets in Pakistan: a district-level analysis. The Pakistan DevelOJ)ment 
~ 33(4), 857-869. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and Mendoza, M. 1996. Alternative water allocation 
mechanisms: Indian and international experiences. Economic and Political 
~ 31(13), March 30, A25 to A30. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and Rosegrant, M.W. 1997. Water as an economic good: 
incentives, institutions, and infrastructure, pp. 312-320 in M. Kay, T. 
Franks and L. Smith (eds.) Water: Economics. Management and Demand, 
E '" FN Spon., London. 
520 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
Moore, M. 1989. The fruits and fallacies of neoliberalism: the case of 
irrigation policy. World Develo.pment 17(11), 1733-1750. 
Oster,I.D. 1984. Leaching for salinity control, pp. 175-189 in I. Shainberg 
and 1. Shalhevet (eds.) Soil Salinity Under Irrigation: Processes and 
Man~ement, Springer-Verlag, New York. 
Perry C.I., Rock M. and Seckler D. 1997. Water as an economic good: a 
solution, or a problem? pp. 3-11 in M. Kay, T. Franks and L. Smith (cds.) 
Water: Economics. Management and Demand, E & FN Spon., London. 
Prasad, K. and Rao, P.K. 1991. On irrigation water pricing in India. ~ 
ResourceS Deve1o.pment 7(4), 274-280. 
Puttaswamaiah, K. 1994. Irrigation Projects in India: Towards a New Policy. 
Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi. 
Quiggin, 1. 1987. Land degradation: behavioral causes, pp. 203-212 in A. 
Chisholm and R. Dumsday (eds) Land Degradation: Problems and 
~, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Qureshi, S.K., Hussain, Z. and Zeb-un-Nisa. 1994. An assessment of 
warabandi (irrigation rotation) in Pakistan: a preliminary analysis. ~ 
Pakistan Deyelo.pment Review 33(4), 845-855. 
Ramanathan, S. and Rathore, M.S. 1994. Sustainability of Indira Gandhi Canal 
and the need for correct responses: a social scientist's perspective, pp. 277-
299 in R. Hooja and P.S. Kavdia (eds.) Planning for Sustainability in 
Irrigation, Rawat Publications, New Delhi. 
Repetto, R., 1986. Skimming the water: rent-seeking and the perfonnance of 
public irrigation systems. Research Report 4, World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC. 
Rhoades, I.D., 1990. Soil salinity - causes and controls, pp. 109-134 in A.S. 
Goudie (ed.) Techniques for Desert Reclamation, Iohn Wiley & Sons, New 
York. 
Rhoades, I.D. and Loveday, J. 1990. Salinity in irrigated agriculture, pp. 
1089-1142 in B.A. Stewart and D.R. Nielsen (eds.) Irrigation of 
Agricultural Crops, American Society of Agronomy, Madison, Wisconsin. 
Economic Approach to Improving Water Management 521 
Rosegrant, M.W. 1997. Water resources in the twenty-first century: challenges 
and implications for action. Food, Agriculture, and the Environment 
Discussion Paper 20. IFPRI, Washington, DC. 
Rosegrant, M.W. and Binswanger, H.P. 1994. Markets in tradable water 
rights: potential for efficiency gains in developing country water resource 
allocation. World Development 22(11), 1613-1625. 
Rosegrant, M.W. and Meinzen-Dick, R.S. 1996. Water resources in the Asia-
Pacific region: managing scarcity. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 
10(2), 32-53. 
Saleth, R.M. 1996. Water Institutions in Indja: Economics. Law. and Policy, 
Commonwealth Publishers, New Delhi. 
Sampath, R.K. 1992. Issues in irrigation pricing in developing countries. 
World Develo.pment 20(7),967-977. 
Scott, S.F. 1993. Water and sustainable agricultural development, pp. 19-50 in 
EcoIoeically Sound Resources Manaeement in Irrigation. German 
Association for Water Resources and Land Improvement, Verlag Paul 
Parey, Hamburg, Germany. 
Sen, A.K. 1984. Resources. Values and DevelQpment, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Shah, T. 1993. Groundwater Market and Irrigatjon Development: Political 
Economic and Practical Policy. Oxford University Press, Bombay. 
Shah, T. and Ballabh, V. 1997. Water markets in north Bihar: six village 
studies in Muzaffarpur District. Economic and Political Weekly 32(52), 
Dec. 27, A-183 to A-1OO. 
Small, L.E. 1989. User charges in irrigation: potentials and limitations. 
Irrigation and Drainaee Systems 3, 125-142. 
Small, L.E. and Carruthers,!. 1991. farmer-Financ:ed Irrigation: The 
Economics of Reform. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Smedema, L.K. 1990. Irrigation performance and waterlogging and salinity. 
Irrieation and Drajnaee Systems 4, 367-374. 
522 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
Stone, I. 1984. Canal Irri~ation in British India: Permectives on Technolo~jcal 
Chan~e in a Peasant Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Strojan, S.T. 1995. The economics of salinization, pp. 188-204 in C.l.C. 
Phillips and P.C. Chiy (eds.) Sodium in Agriculture, Chalcombe 
Publications, Kent, UK. 
Svendsen, M. and Meinzen-Dick, R. 1997. Irrigation management institutions 
in transition: a look back, a look forward. Irrigation and Draina~e Systems 
11, 139-156. 
Szabolcs, I. 1987. The global problems of salt-affected soils. Acta Agronomica 
Hungarica,36(1-2), 159-172. 
Tsur, Y. and Dinar A. 1997. The relative efficiency and implementation costs 
of alternative methods for pricing irrigation water. The World Bank 
Economic Review 11(2), 243-262. 
Upstill, G. and Yapp, T. 1987. Offsite costs ofland degradation, pp. 99-107 in 
A. Chisholm and R. Dumsday (eds) Land Degradation: Problems and 
~, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Upton, M. 1996. The Economics of Trwical Farming Systems, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Weinberg, M., Kling, C.L. and Wilen, J.E. 1993. Water markets and water 
quality. America,n Journal of Agricultural Economics 75, 278-291. 
Young R.A. and Homer G.L. 1986. Irrigated agriculture and mineralized 
water, pp. 77-116 in T;T. Phipps, P.R. Crosson, and K.A. Price (eds.) 
Agriculture and the Environment, Resources for the Future, Washington, 
DC. 
